It is typical to assume that there is no conflict of interest among leaders. Under such assumption, it is known that, for a multi-agent system with two leaders, if the followers' interaction subgraph is undirected and connected, then followers will converge to a convex combination of two leaders' states with linear consensus protocol. In this paper, we introduce the conflict between leaders: by choosing k followers to connect with, every leader attempts all followers converge to himself closer than that of the other. By using graph theory and matrix theory, we formulate this conflict as a standard two-player zero-sum game and give some properties about it. It is noteworthy that the interaction graph here is generated from the conflict between leaders. Interestingly, we find that to find the optimal topology of the system is equivalent to solve a Nash equilibrium. Especially for the case of choosing one connected follower, the necessary and sufficient condition for an interaction graph to be the optimal one is given. Moreover, if followers' interaction graph is a circuPreprint submitted to 28 October 2014 lant graph or a graph with a center node, then the system's optimal topology is obtained.
cally explained by graph theory in [7] . Olfati-Saber and Murray developed a systematical framework of consensus problem in networks of dynamic agents with switching topology and time-delays in [8] . Some relaxed conditions were obtained for first-order MASs in [9] , where consensus is solved if there exists a spanning tree. Following [7, 8, 9] , there have been extensive studies and results under various circumstances, to name but a few, second-order consensus [10] , consensus of heterogeneous MASs [11, 12] and finite-time consensus [13, 14] , etc.
As a special role in MASs, leaders are ubiquitous in nature, for instance, the navigation aircraft in a fight formation of UAVs and the leading whale in a whale population. This fact attracts researchers' great attention and leads to some research hotspots such that leader-following consensus [15, 16] , containment control problem [20, 22] and controllability analysis [24, 25, 26] . For a multi-agent system with a single leader, followers will converge to the state of leader, which is called the tracking control or leader-following consensus problem. Sufficient conditions for solving leader-following consensus were brought up for MASs [15, 16] . Based on linear quadratic regular theory, Ma et al. proved that the optimal topology of leaderfollowing consensus is a star graph [17] . As an extension of leader-following consensus, containment control problem of MASs with multiple leaders means that the states of the follower will converge to the convex hull spanned by the leaders. In [18] , the authors assumed the leaders located in vertices of a convex polytope, and presented a hybrid Stop-Go strategy for first-order leaders with the fixed undirected topology. Notarstefano et al. investigated containment control of first-order MASs with switching topologies [19] . Liu et al. obtained the necessary and sufficient conditions for solving containment control of multi-agent systems with multiple stationary and dynamic leaders under directed networks in [20] . Some research topics of containment control under different systems have also been addressed, such as containment control for second-order MASs [21] , for heterogeneous MASs [22] and for MASs with measurement noises [23] .
In a multi-agent system, each agent is an individual who exchanges information with their neighbors and then makes decision independently. If we further define the utility of agents and assume that individuals adjust its behaviors by promoting utility, game theory can be introduced to distributed multi-agent coordination.
By reviewing consensus seeking as a non-cooperative differential game, Bauso et al. [27] proposed a game theoretic interpretation of consensus problems as mechanism design problems. By imposing individual objectives, the author proved that such objectives can be designed so that rational agents have a unique optimal protocol, and asymptotically reach consensus on a desired group decision value. In [2] , the author investigated formation control via a linear-quadratic (LQ) Nash differential game and gave a RHC-based approach. While as in [28] , cooperative game theory is utilized to ensure team cooperation by considering a combination of individual cost as the team cost and the Nash-bargaining solution is obtained. For leader-following MASs, the notion of graphical game was formulated in [29] . The author brought together cooperative control, reinforcement learning, and game theory to solve multi-player differential games on communication graph topologies and proposed a cooperative policy iteration algorithm for graphical games that converges to the best response. Gharesifard and Cortés introduced the distributed convergence to Nash equilibrium for two networks engaged in a strategic scenario in [30] .
Our results
Different from the aforementioned literatures, we propose a multi-agent system with two leaders and formulate a type of game. For a multi-agent system with two leaders, if the followers' interaction subgraph G F is undirected and connected, then each follower will converge to a convex combination of two leaders' states [20] .
Based on this result, we assume that every leader can independently select k (≥ 1) followers to connect with him. Then, we define the average distance to the followers as the payoff function of each leader. There is a conflict of interest between two leaders -what one gains incurs a loss to the other. Therefore, we can describe this process as a noncooperative game in which each leader independently chooses an optimal strategy (i.e., the connected followers) to minimize his payoff function.
Noticing that two leaders' decisions will determine the interaction topologies of the system, a Nash equilibrium point corresponds to an optimal topology of the system.
The main contributions of this paper are threefold. Firstly, we formulate a new type of game for multi-agent system. Secondly, by utilizing containment control and matrix theory, we reformulate the game as a zero-sum game denoted by G k (G F ) and develop some properties based on game theory. Finally, for the case k = 1, the necessary and sufficient condition for an interaction graph to be the optimal topology is given. Moreover, if G F is a circulant graph or a graph with a center node, then the optimal topology is obtained. It should be mentioned that these results offer some theoretical explanations to some commercial and political phenomena.
Consider two companies selling similar product or two candidates promoting an election, both of two opponents aim to propagate their opinion in social networks by choosing some members as their supporters from it. In the scenario where the influence power of every member is equal, everyone is the optimal strategy for two opponents. If a social network exists a 'center' member who can influence all the others, then both of two opponents will select this member to maximize their own influence.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the graph theory and two-person zero-sum game and propose our problem. In Section 3, we give our main results. And in Section 4, numerical simulations are given to illustrate the effectiveness of the theoretical results. Some conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
Notation: Throughout this paper, the following notations will be used: let R be the set of real numbers. R n×m is the set of n × m real matrices. Denote by 1 n (or 0 n ) the column vector with all entries equal to one (or all zeros). I n denotes an
is a diagonal matrix with b i , i = 1, ..., n, on its diagonal and 
Graph Theory
In this subsection, we present some basic notions of algebraic graph which will be used in this paper.
Let G = {V, E} be an undirected graph consisting of a vertex set V = {1, 2, ..., n} and It is obviously that a complete graph is circulant. 
where η = max 1≤m≤k l i m i m and ∆ =
Because ∆ and
Two-person zero-sum games
In this subsection, we present the notions of a class of two-player zero-sum games where each player has a finite number of strategies to choose from. For more details, please refer to [31] .
Consider a zero-sum game of two players, to be referred to as player P 1 and player P 2 , in which each player has finite alternatives. Denote the set of strategies of P 1 and
..,ŝ n }, respectively. A pair of strategies (s i ,ŝ j ) ∈ S 1 × S 2 means that P 1 chooses the strategy s i and P 2 chooses the strategŷ s j . For strategies pair (s i ,ŝ j ), the payoff of P 1 is −a i j while that of P 2 is a i j . Then, A = {a i j } m×n is called the outcome of the game and this type of two-person zerosum game is called a matrix game A. In a matrix game A, P 1 wants to minimize the outcome of the game, while P 2 seeks to maximize it, by independent decisions.
Under such an incentive, P 1 is forced to pick a strategy s i * satisfied
The strategy s i * is called a security strategy for P 1 . Similarly, P 2 will choose a security strategyŝ j * determined by
Denote S * 1 and S * 2 be the set of the security strategies of P 1 and P 2 , respectively.
Lemma 3 [31] In every matrix game A = {a i j },
(1) V(A) and V(A) are unique, (2) there exists at least one security strategy for each player, (3) V(A) ≤ V(A).
Definition 1 [31] For a given (m × n) matrix game A = {a i j }, if a strategies pair 
(3) V(A) is uniquely given by V(A) = V(A).

Problem statement
Consider a multi-agent system consisting of n followers and two leaders. The set of the followers is denoted as V = {1, . . . , n}, and the two leaders are denoted as l 0 and l 1 . The interaction of the followers is described by an undirected graph G F = (V, E).
The following assumption is given throughout this paper.
Assumption 1 (Connectivity) G F is connected.
The leaders l 0 and l 1 keep static states denoted by y 0 , y 1 ∈ R, respectively. Without loss of generality, we assume y 0 < y 1 . The state of follower i ∈ V is denoted as
The dynamics of x i (t) is given bẏ
where N i represents the neighbor set of i in G F and
denote whether the follower i is connected to the leader l 0 and l 1 or not, respectively.
where L is the Laplacian matrix of G F . Form [20] , we have
Lemma 5
If each leader has connected one agent at least in G F (i.e., b 0 n and
In this paper, we consider the following game regarding the multi-agent system (2)(see Fig. 1 ): Players Let l 0 and l 1 be two players.
with, i.e., the set of strategies of each player is S = {s j = (a 1 , a 2 , ..., a n )
Obviously, S is a finite set and |S | = C k n N. Then, let
Payoff The goal of each player is to steer all followers to move forward to himself as closely as possible. As a result, the payoff of each leader can be described as the average distance between the followers and himself. Define
as the payoff function of l 0 and l 1 , respectively. Then every player wants to chooses a strategy from S to minimize his payoff.
According to Lemma 5, we find
and 
Main results
In this section, we will first reformulate the above game and give some properties about it. Then the case of k = 1 will be investigated further, and the necessary and sufficient condition for an interaction graph to be an optimal topology will be gotten. Moreover, the optimal topologies of some special cases will be solved.
Probelm reformulation
It follows from (3) and (5) that
Therefore, l 0 attempts to minimize n k=1 In the subsequent development, some properties of the game G k (G F ) will be investigated.
Property 1 For the strategies pair (s
Proof. The proof is straightforward from the definition of U and (4).
and V(U) ≤ 
Then we get u ii = 
On the other hand, from Property 2, we have
for all i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}. Therefore,
That is to say s i * ∈ S * 1 and
. 
Because of α + β = 1 n , we have α = β = 
Special case: k = 1
In this subsection we discuss the case of k = 1 which means each player can connect only with one follower in G F . Denote the game as G 1 (G F ). Then the two players have n alternatives and the strategies set can be denoted as S = {e 1 , e 2 , ..., e n }. In order to find the optimal topology, we know from above Properties that it is necessary to determine whether the inequalities u i j ≤ 
Proof. From Property 1, we have u i j < 1 2
. According to (3) and (4), we get
It follows from (L
Noticing that
and
one has
By using Laplace expansion along column k, it follows from Lemma 1 that
where l ki is the ki th entry of L. Likewise, we also have det(L + diag{e j }) = τ(G F ).
Thus, we obtain 
Thus, we can make a conclusion that
Similarly, we can proof the case of "=" and ">".
Based on this result, we can decide whether an interaction graphG(e i , e j ) is the optimal topology or not. The following result is obtained:
ThenG(e i * , e j * ) is the optimal topology if and only if e i * ∈ S e and e j * ∈ S e .
Proof. Because of Definition 3, it is suffice to prove that (e i * , e j * ) is a Nash equilibium point if and only if e i * ∈ S e and e j * ∈ S e . It follows from Theorem 1 that
Sufficiency. Due to (11) ≤ u i j * for all i, j ∈ I n . According (11), we have e i * ∈ S e . Since u i j
Hence, e j * ∈ S e .
For the game G 1 (G F ), we have an interesting property as follows:
Property 5 For every strategies pair (e
Proof. For the case of i = j, it follows from Property 4 that lim t→∞ (
For the case of i j, one can renumber nodes of G F by exchanging the number of 1 and i and that of 2 and j, i.e., 1 ↔ i, 2 ↔ j. 
Consequently, it suffices to prove the theorem in the case of i = 1 and j = 2.
.., r n ) where p i , r i are n-dimension vectors. Thus, it is easy to find that
and p 1 = r 2 = 1 n . Consequently,L 1L Letting p 2 = (w 1 , w 2 , ..., w n ) T and r 1 = (z 1 , z 2 , .., z n ), we obtain
and (10) we get
. It follows that Since µ + µ(λ 1 + λ
Graphical results
In this subsection we will deduce some graphical results for G 1 (G F ). Firstly, we present the following Lemma.
Lemma 6 For all i j, we have
where
Proof. Firstly, we will prove the case of i < j.
where M ji = 0 and
It is easy to prove that
Hence, we obtain
Similarly, we can prove the case of i > j. Now we will give some graphical results for the game G 1 (G F ):
and the equality holds if and only if
Proof. Similar to the proof of Property 5, it suffices to prove the theorem in the case of i = 1 and j = 2.
It follows from (7) and (12) Since (12), we have
It is easy to observe that (−1) Proof. Since N i \ { j} = ∅, the proof is straightforward. Proof. Firstly, we will prove (1):
Theorem 4 For the game
If G F is a circulant graph, then the adjacent matrix A is a circulant matrix. It follows that L is also a circulant matrix. Without loss of generality, we assume that i < j.
Then for a permutation matrix
we haveL i = PL j P T . Notice that P is orthogonal, we obtain that
Then it follows from Pe j = e i and 1
Hence, form Theorem 1, we get u i j = 1 2 for all i, j ∈ V, i.e., U = 1 2 1 n 1 T n . Then we can deduce that the strategy set is S * = S . In another words, the graphG(e i , e j ) is the optimal topology for every (e i , e j ) ∈ S × S .
Next, we will give the proof of (2):
For simplicity, we may take i c = n. Owing to N n = {1, 2, ..., n−1}, one has N j \{n} ⊆ N n \ { j} for all j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n − 1}. Then from Theorem 3, we have u n j ≤ 1 2 for all j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n − 1}. Hence, V(U) = V(U) = 1 2 and e n ∈ S * . From Property 3 and 4, it follows that the strategies pair (e n , e n ) is a Nash equilibrium point. Thus, we can conclude thatG(e n , e n ) is the optimal topology. .
Corollary 3 If G F is a complete graph, thenG(e i , e j ) is the optimal topology for
arbitrary (e i , e j ) ∈ S × S .
Simulation
In this section, we give two numerical simulations to illustrate the effectiveness of theoretical results in Section 3.
Consider there are 6 followers labeled as 1-6 and two leaders labeled as l 0 and l 1 .
Let the leaders' initial state be -1 and 1, respectively. Define d 0 (t) = Obviously, we have lim t→∞ d j (t) = U j ( j = 0, 1).
Example 1 Let the followers' interaction graph G F be a circulant graph depicted
in Fig. 2 (a) . Then, it is easy to obtain that the outcome matrix of the game
is U = Fig. 2 (b) , Fig. 2 (c) and Fig. 2 (d) , respectively. Fig. 3 Fig. 4 (a) . It is easy to find that the follower 1 is a center node in G F . We can obtain the outcome matrix 
Example 2 The followers' interaction graph G F is depicted in
Obviously, u 11 = min i max j u i j = min j max i u i j . Therefore, we can conclude that andG(e 1 , e 1 ) are depicted in Fig. 4(a) and Fig. 4(b) , respectively. Fig. 5 In this paper, we make use of game theory to tackle containment control problem with leaders. Firstly, we assumed that the followers' interaction subgraph G F was undirected and connected and every leader can independently select k (≥ 1) followers to connect with. By choosing his connected followers, each leader attempted to minimize his payoff which was defined as the average distance from himself to all followers. Then we proved that the sum of two payoffs is constant. Because every strategies pair corresponds to an interaction graph of the system, it was noted that to find a Nash equilibrium is equivalent to solve the optimal topology of the system. Intuitively, this is induced by the constant number of followers: if a leader has more followers then the other leader has fewer followers. The same applies to the distance between the followers and their leader. Secondly, we redefined this game as a standard two-player zero-sum game denoted as G k (G F ) and obtained some properties for it. Thirdly, we further investigated the case of k = 1. For the game G 1 (G F ), the necessary and sufficient condition for an interaction graph to be the optimal topology was given. And if G F was a circulant graph or a graph with a center node, then the optimal topology was also obtained. This work puts containment control in a game theoretical framework, this perspective will foster the understanding of the interactions between leaders. Future work may consider this game for some MASs with constrains, such as MASs with switching topologies, MASs under measurement noises and MASs with quantized information transmission, etc.
